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Abstract
The nature of the wave function has been a hot topic of debate since
the early days of quantum mechanics. The recent PBR theorem proves
that the wave function is ontic, representing the ontic state of a physical
system or a concrete physical entity. On the other hand, Bohmian
mechanics regards the wave function as not ontic but nomological, like
a law of nature. This raises an interesting question: does the PBR
theorem refute Bohmian mechanics? It seems widely thought that
the ontic view and the nomological view are compatible, and thus the
PBR theorem has no implications for Bohmian mechanics. In this
paper, I argue that this is not the case. First, I point out that the
nomological view and the ontic view are two different views of the wave
function. This means that the result of the PBR theorem and Bohmian
mechanics are incompatible. Next, I argue that the PBR theorem
and Bohmian mechanics are nevertheless compatible, and the former
does not refute the latter. The reason is that the PBR theorem and
Bohmian mechanics are based on different fundamental assumptions,
and in particular, Bohmian mechanics rejects one key assumption of
the ontological models framework on which the PBR theorem is based.
Finally, I argue that the rejection of this assumption will bring to our
attention a potential important issue of Bohmian mechanics.
1 Introduction
It has been suggested that the wave function of the universe is not ontic,
representing a concrete physical entity, but nomological, like a law of nature
(Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zangh`ı, 1997; Allori et al, 2008; Goldstein, 2017). On
this nomological view of the wave function, there are only particles in three-
dimensional space in Bohmian mechanics. On the other hand, a general and
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rigorous approach called ontological models framework has been proposed
to determine the relation between the wave function and the ontic state of a
physical system (Spekkens, 2005; Harrigan and Spekkens, 2010), and several
ψ-ontology theorems have been proved in the framework (Pusey, Barrett
and Rudolph, 2012; Colbeck and Renner, 2012, 2017; Hardy, 2013). In
particular, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem or the PBR theorem shows
that in the ontological models framework, when assuming independently
prepared systems have independent ontic states, the ontic state of a physical
system uniquely determines its wave function, and the wave function of a
physical system directly represents the ontic state of the system (Pusey,
Barrett and Rudolph, 2012). An interesting question then arises: are the
ontic view and the nomological view of wave function compatible? More
specifically, is Bohmian mechanics consistent with the PBR theorem? Or
does the PBR theorem already refute Bohmian mechanics?
This issue has not received much attention from researchers. Goldstein’s
(2017) authoritative review of Bohmian mechanics does not mention the
PBR theorem. Esfeld et al’s (2014) insightful paper about the ontology of
Bohmian mechanics only refers to the theorem once without any discussion.
Presumably it is thought that the PBR theorem and Bohmian mechanics
are obviously compatible. They both say that the wave function is real
for single physical systems after all. Furthermore, according to Esfeld et al
(2014), although Bohmian mechanics says that the universal wave function
is nomological, it regards the effective wave function of a subsystem in the
universe as ontic, representing “an objective, physical degree of freedom
belonging to the subsystem”, and thus the theory is compatible with the
PBR theorem. In this paper, I will argue that this view is not wholly correct,
and a careful analysis of the compatibility between Bohmian mechanics and
the PBR theorem will bring to our attention a potential important issue of
the theory.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I first intro-
duce Bohmian mechanics and the nomological view of the wave function. It
is widely thought that this view can avoid the problems of interpreting the
wave function as a physical entity over and above the particles in Bohm’s
theory. In Section 3, I then introduce the ontological models framework and
the PBR theorem based on the framework. The PBR theorem proves that
the wave function is ontic, representing the ontic state of a physical system
or a concrete physical entity. In Section 4, I point out that the nomolog-
ical view and the ontic view are two different views of the wave function.
This means that the result of the PBR theorem and Bohmian mechanics
are incompatible. In Section 5, I argue that the PBR theorem and Bohmian
mechanics are nevertheless compatible, and the former does not refute the
latter. The reason is that the PBR theorem and Bohmian mechanics are
based on different fundamental assumptions, and in particular, Bohmian
mechanics rejects one key assumption of the ontological models framework
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on which the PBR theorem is based. In Section 6, I argue that by rejecting
this assumption to avoid the result of the PBR theorem, Bohmian mechan-
ics denies the existence of a universal law, while this may prevent us from
knowing the nature of the wave function in the theory. Conclusions are
given in the last section.
2 Bohmian mechanics
Bohmian mechanics, being a modern formulation of Bohm’s (1952) theory,
is committed only to particles’ positions and a law of motion that describes
how the positions develop in time (Esfeld et al, 2014; Goldstein, 2017). The
theory provides an ontology of quantum mechanics in terms of particles and
their trajectories in physical space and time. The Bohmian law of motion is
expressed by two equations, a guiding equation for the configuration of par-
ticles in three-dimensional space and the Schro¨dinger equation, describing
the time evolution of the wave function that enters the guiding equation.
The law can be formulated as follows:
dQ(t)
dt
= vΨ(t)(Q(t)), (1)
i~
∂Ψ(t)
∂t
= HΨ(t), (2)
where Q(t) denotes the spatial configuration of particles, Ψ(t) is the wave
function of the particle configuration at time t, and v equals to the ve-
locity of probability density in standard quantum mechanics. Moreover, it
is postulated that at some initial instant t0, the epistemic probability of
the configuration, ρ(t0), is given by the Born rule: ρ(t0) = |Ψ(t0)|2. This
is called quantum equilibrium hypothesis, which, together with the law of
motion, ensures the empirical equivalence between Bohmian mechanics and
standard quantum mechanics.
The status of the above equations is different, depending on whether one
considers the physical description of the universe as a whole or of a subsystem
thereof. Bohmian mechanics starts from the concept of a universal wave
function (i.e. the wave function of the universe), figuring in the fundamental
law of motion for all the particles in the universe. That is, Q(t) describes
the configuration of all the particles in the universe at time t, and Ψ(t) is the
wave function of the universe at time t, guiding the motion of all particles
taken together. To describe subsystems of the universe, the appropriate
concept is the effective wave function in Bohmian mechanics.
The effective wave function is the Bohmian analogue of the usual wave
function in standard quantum mechanics. It is not primitive, but derived
from the universal wave function and the actual spatial configuration of all
the particles ignored in the description of the respective subsystem (Du¨rr,
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Goldstein and Zangh`ı, 1992). The effective wave function of a subsystem
can be defined as follows. Let A be a subsystem of the universe including N
particles with position variables x = (x1, x2, ..., xN ). Let y = (y1, y2, ..., yM )
be the position variables of all other particles not belonging to A. Then the
subsystem A’s conditional wave function at time t is defined as the universal
wave function Ψt(x, y) evaluated at y = Y (t):
ψAt (x) = Ψt(x, y)|y=Y (t). (3)
If the universal wave function can be decomposed in the following form:
Ψt(x, y) = ϕt(x)φt(y) + Θt(x, y), (4)
where φt(y) and Θt(x, y) are functions with macroscopically disjoint sup-
ports, and Y (t) lies within the support of φt(y), then ψ
A
t (x) = ϕt(x) (up to
a multiplicative constant) is A’s effective wave function at t. It can be seen
that the temporal evolution of A’s particles is given in terms of A’s condi-
tional wave function in the usual Bohmian way, and when the conditional
wave function is A’s effective wave function, it also obeys a Schro¨dinger dy-
namics of its own. This means that the effective descriptions of subsystems
are of the same form of the law of motion as given above.
Bohmian mechanics raises the question of the status of the wave function
that figures in the law. The theory assumes the nomological interpretation of
the wave function, according to which the relationship between the universal
wave function and the motion of the particles should be conceived as a nomic
one, instead of a causal one in terms of one physical entity acting on the other
(Du¨rr, Goldstein and Zangh`ı, 1997; Goldstein and Teufel, 2001; Goldstein
and Zangh`ı, 2013; Esfeld et al, 2014). In the words of Du¨rr, Goldstein and
Zangh`ı (1997),
The wave function of the universe is not an element of physi-
cal reality. We propose that the wave function belongs to an
altogether different category of existence than that of substan-
tive physical entities, and that its existence is nomological rather
than material. We propose, in other words, that the wave func-
tion is a component of a physical law rather than of the reality
described by the law. (p. 10)
The reasons to adopt this nomological view of the wave function come
from the unusual kind of way in which Bohmian mechanics is formulated,
and the unusual kind of behavior that the wave function undergoes in the
theory. First of all, although the wave function affects the behavior of the
configuration of the particles, which is expressed by the guiding equation
(1), there is no back action of the configuration upon the wave function.
The evolution of the wave function is governed by the Schro¨dinger equation
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(2), in which the actual configuration Q(t) does not appear. Since a physical
entity is supposed to satisfy the action-reaction principle, the wave function
cannot describe a physical entity in Bohmian mechanics.
Next, the wave function of a many-particle system, ψ(q1, ..., qN ), is de-
fined not in our ordinary three-dimensional space, but in the 3N -dimensional
configuration space, the set of all hypothetical configurations of the system.
Thus it seems untenable to view the wave function as directly describing a
real physical field. In fact, the sort of physical field the wave function is
supposed to describe is even more abstract. Since two wave functions such
that one is a (nonzero) scalar multiple of the other are physically equivalent,
what the wave function describes is not even a physical field at all, but an
equivalence class of physical fields. Moreover, Bohmian mechanics regards
identical particles such as electrons as unlabelled, so that the configuration
space of N such particles is not the familiar high dimensional space, like
R3N , but is the unfamiliar high-dimensional space NR3 of N -point subsets
of R3. This space has a nontrivial topology, which may naturally lead to
the possibilities of bosons and fermions. But it seems odd as a fundamental
space in which a physical field exists.
Thirdly, the wave function in Bohmian mechanics plays a role that is
analogous to that of the Hamiltonian in classical Hamiltonian mechanics
(Goldstein and Zangh`ı, 2013). To begin with, both the classical Hamiltonian
and the wave function live on a high dimensional space. The wave function
is defined in configuration space, while the classical Hamiltonian is defined
in phase space: a space that has twice as many dimensions as configuration
space. Next, there is a striking analogy between the guiding equation in
Bohmian mechanics and the Hamiltonian equations in classical mechanics.
The guiding equation can be written as:
dQ
dt
= der(logψ), (5)
where the symbol der denotes some sort of derivative. Similarly, the Hamil-
tonian equations can be written is a compact way as:
dX
dt
= der(H), (6)
where der(H) is a suitable derivative of the Hamiltonian. Moreover, it
is also true that both logψ and H are normally regarded as defined only
up to an additive constant. Adding a constant to H doesn’t change the
equations of motion. Similarly, when multiplying the wave function by a
scalar, which amounts to adding a constant to its log, the new wave function
is physically equivalent to the original one, and they define the same velocity
for the configuration in the equations of motion in Bohmian mechanics.
Since the classical Hamiltonian is regarded not as a description of some
physical entity, but as the generator of time evolution in classical mechanics,
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by the above analogy it seems natural to assume that the wave function is
not a description of some physical entity either, but a similar generator of
the equations of motion in Bohmian mechanics.
These analyses suggest that the wave function is nomological, describing
a law and not describing some sort of concrete physical entity in Bohmian
mechanics. A law of motion tells us what happens in space and time given
the specification of initial conditions, but it is not itself a physical entity
existing in space and time. The exact meaning of the wave function then
depends on what exactly a law is. There are two main views about laws
of nature in the literature, namely Humeanism and dispositionalism, and
both of them can be drawn upon for developing the nomological interpre-
tation of the wave function in Bohmian mechanics (Esfeld et al, 2014). By
Humeanism about laws, there are only particles’ positions in the ontology,
while dispositionalism admits more in the ontology than particles’ positions,
namely the holistic disposition of all the particles in the universe.1 My fol-
lowing analysis of Bohmian mechanics and the nomological view of the wave
function is independent of how to understand laws of nature.
3 The PBR theorem
Although there are various reasons to adopt the nomological view of the wave
function in Bohm’s theory, there are also more rigorous arguments support-
ing the ontic view of the wave function. In this section, I will introduce the
ontological models framework and an important ψ-ontology theorem, the
PBR theorem.
Quantum mechanics, in its minimum formulation, is an algorithm for
calculating probabilities of measurement results. The theory assigns a math-
ematical object, the wave function, to a physical system appropriately pre-
pared at a given instant, and specifies how the wave function evolves with
time. The time evolution of the wave function is governed by the Schro¨dinger
equation, and the connection of the wave function with the results of mea-
surements on the system is specified by the Born rule. At first sight, quan-
tum mechanics as an algorithm says nothing about the actual state of a
physical system. However, it has been known that this is not true due to
the recent advances in the research of the foundations of quantum mechanics
(see Leifer, 2014 for a helpful review).
First of all, a general and rigorous approach called ontological models
framework has been proposed to determine the relation between the wave
1Note that Bohmian mechanics is also compatible with a primitivism about laws as
suggested by Maudlin (2007). It has been argued that primitivism about laws faces a
dilemma: “either it has to bite the bullet of conceiving the law as developing itself in time
and as including differences that correspond to different initial wave-functions, or it has
to conceive the universal wave-function as a physical entity.” (Dorato and Esfeld, 2015)
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function and the ontic state of a physical system (Spekkens 2005; Harri-
gan and Spekkens 2010). The framework has two fundamental assumptions.
The first assumption is about the existence of the underlying state of re-
ality. It says that if a physical system is prepared such that the quantum
algorithm assigns a wave function to it, then after preparation the system
has a well-defined set of physical properties or an underlying ontic state,
which is usually represented by a mathematical object, λ. In general, for an
ensemble of identically prepared systems to which the same wave function
ψ is assigned, the ontic states of different systems in the ensemble may be
different, and the wave function ψ corresponds to a probability distribution
p(λ|ψ) over all possible ontic states, where ∫ dλp(λ|ψ) = 1.
There are two possible types of models in the ontological models frame-
work, namely ψ-ontic models and ψ-epistemic models. In a ψ-ontic model,
the ontic state of a physical system uniquely determines its wave function,
and the probability distributions corresponding to two different wave func-
tions do not overlap. In this case, the wave function directly represents the
ontic state of the system.2 While in a ψ-epistemic model, the probability
distributions corresponding to two different wave functions may overlap, and
there are at least two wave functions which are compatible with the same
ontic state of a physical system. In this case, the wave function merely
represents a state of incomplete knowledge - an epistemic state - about the
actual ontic state of the system.
In order to investigate whether an ontological model is consistent with
the quantum algorithm, we also need a rule of connecting the underlying
ontic states with measurement results. This is the second assumption of
the ontological models framework, which says that when a measurement is
performed, the behaviour of the measuring device is determined by the ontic
state of the system, along with the physical properties of the measuring
device. Concretely speaking, for a projective measurement M , the ontic
state λ of a physical system determines the probability p(k|λ,M) of different
results k for the measurement M on the system. The consistency with the
quantum algorithm then requires the following relation:∫
dλp(k|λ,M)p(λ|ψ) = p(k|M,ψ), (7)
where p(k|M,ψ) = |〈k|ψ〉|2 is the Born probability of k given M and the
wave function ψ.
Second, several important ψ-ontology theorems have been proved in the
ontological models framework (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012; Colbeck
and Renner, 2012, 2017; Hardy, 2013), the strongest one of which is the PBR
theorem (Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012). The PBR theorem shows
2Note that the wave function is not necessarily complete, i.e. it does not necessarily
represent the complete ontic state of a system.
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that in the ontological models framework, when assuming independently
prepared systems have independent ontic states, the ontic state of a phys-
ical system uniquely determines its wave function, or the wave function of
a physical system directly represents the ontic state of the system. This
auxiliary assumption is called preparation independence assumption.
The basic proof strategy of the PBR theorem is as follows. Assume there
are N nonorthogonal quantum states ψi (i=1, ... , N), which are compatible
with the same ontic state λ.3 The ontic state λ determines the probability
p(k|λ,M) of different results k for the measurement M . Moreover, there is a
normalization relation for any N result measurement:
∑N
i=1 p(ki|λ,M) = 1.
Now if an N result measurement satisfies the condition that the first state
gives zero Born probability to the first result and the second state gives zero
Born probability to the second result and so on, then there will be a relation
p(ki|λ,M) = 0 for any i, which leads to a contradiction.
The task is then to find whether there are such nonorthogonal states and
the corresponding measurement. Obviously there is no such a measurement
for two nonorthogonal states of a physical system, since this will permit them
to be perfectly distinguished, which is prohibited by quantum mechanics.
However, such a measurement does exist for four nonorthogonal states of
two copies of a physical system. The four nonorthogonal states are the
following product states: |0〉 ⊗ |0〉, |0〉 ⊗ |+〉,|+〉 ⊗ |0〉 and |+〉 ⊗ |+〉, where
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉). The corresponding measurement is a joint measurement
of the two systems, which projects onto the following four orthogonal states:
φ1 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉),
φ2 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |+〉),
φ3 =
1√
2
(|+〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |0〉),
φ4 =
1√
2
(|+〉 ⊗ |−〉+ |−〉 ⊗ |+〉), (8)
where |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). This proves that the four nonorthogonal states
are ontologically distinct. In order to further prove the two nonorthogonal
states |0〉 and |+〉 for one system are ontologically distinct, the preparation
independence assumption is needed. Under this assumption, a similar proof
for every pair of nonorthogonal states can also be found, which requires more
than two copies of a physical system (see Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph, 2012
for the complete proof).
To sum up, the PBR theorem shows that quantum mechanics as an
algorithm may also say something about the actual ontic state of a physical
system. It is that under the preparation independence assumption, the
3It can be readily shown that different orthogonal states correspond to different ontic
states. Thus the proof given here concerns only nonorthogonal states.
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wave function assigned to a physical system, which is used for calculating
probabilities of results of measurements on the system, is a mathematical
representation of the ontic state of the system in the ontological models
framework.
Here it may be worth noting that the PBR theorem also applies to the
universe as a whole. First, the universe as a whole is a perfectly isolated
system. Then, if the wave function of an isolated system is ontic, the wave
function of the universe must be ontic too. One may object that since the
second assumption of the ontological models framework concerns measure-
ments, while nothing exists outside the universe and no measurements can
be made on it, the results obtained based on the framework such as the
PBR theorem may be not valid for the universe as a whole. However, this
is a misunderstanding. The reason is that the measurements involved in the
second assumption of the ontological models framework are not necessarily
actual. The assumption is essentially about the connection between the on-
tic state of an isolated system and the Born rule. If only the Born rule is
universally valid for any wave function and the universe as a whole has an
ontic state, then this assumption will apply to the universe, and the results
obtained based on the framework will be also valid for it.
Next, if the ontic state of every isolated subsystem of the universe is
represented by a wave function, and in particular, when the subsystem is
an entangled composite system, its ontic state is also represented by a wave
function, then it is arguable that the ontic state of all these subsystems as
a whole should be represented by an (entangled) wave function. In other
words, the ontic state of the universe as a whole should be represented by
a wave function. For example, suppose the wave function of each isolated
system in the universe is a real physical field (Albert, 1996, 2013, 2015),
then since the universe is composed of these fields, its ontic state must be
also a field (in a space with the largest dimension).
There are three possible ways to avoid the result of the PBR theorem.
The first is to deny the preparation independence assumption. Although
this assumption seems very natural, it is rejected in some ψ-epistemic mod-
els (Lewis et al, 2012). The second is to deny the first assumption of the
ontological models framework, i.e. denying that an isolated system has a
state of reality, which is objective and independent of other systems includ-
ing observers. Indeed, this assumption is rejected by Quantum Bayesianism
or QBism (Fuchs et al, 2014) and other pragmatist approaches to quan-
tum theory (Healey, 2017), where the wave function represents information
about possible measurement results or it is only a calculational tool for mak-
ing predictions concerning measurement results. The third way is to deny
the second assumption of the ontological models framework. We will discuss
this possibility later.
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4 The wave function: ontic vs. nomological
It seems obvious that the ontic view and the nomological view are two
different views of the wave function. According to the ontic view, the wave
function, including the wave function of the universe, is ontic, representing
the ontic state of a physical system or a concrete physical entity. While
according to the nomological view, the universal wave function is not ontic
but nomological, like a law of nature, and it does not represent a concrete
physical entity.
This difference between the ontic view and the nomological view also
exists for any isolated subsystems in the universe. For example, suppose
the universe contains two isolated subsystems, and their wave function is
a product state. Then, the ontic view regards the wave function of each
subsystem as ontic, representing a concrete physical entity, while the nomo-
logical view still regards the wave function of each subsystem as nomological,
representing no concrete physical entity.
What about the effective wave functions of the quasi-isolated subsystems
of the universe? According to Esfeld et al (2014), the effective wave func-
tion of a subsystem encodes the non-local influences of other particles on
the subsystem via the non-local law of Bohmian mechanics. For example,
in the double-slit experiment with one particle at a time, the particle goes
through exactly one of the two slits, and that is all there is in the physical
world. There is no real physical field that guides the motion of the particle
and propagates through both slits and undergoes interference. The devel-
opment of the position of the particle (its velocity and thus its trajectory)
is determined by the positions of other particles in the universe, including
the particles composing the experimental setup, and the non-local law of
Bohmian mechanics can account for the observed particle position on the
screen (Esfeld et al, 2014). In this sense, one may say that the nomological
view also regards the effective wave function as ontic, and thus it is consis-
tent with the ontic view for the quasi-isolated subsystems of the universe.
However, it can be argued that the effective wave function of a subsystem
of the universe does not encode the influences of other particles on the
subsystem, and it cannot be wholly ontic according to the nomological view
(see also Gao, 2017). First of all, consider the simplest case in which the
universal wave function factorizes so that
Ψt(x, y) = ϕt(x)φt(y). (9)
where x = (x1, x2, ..., xN ) is the position variables of N particles of a sub-
system A of the universe, and y = (y1, y2, ..., yM ) is the position variables of
all other particles not belonging to A. Then ψAt (x) = ϕt(x) is subsystem A’s
effective wave function at t. In this case, it is uncontroversial that subsystem
A and its environment, which are represented by ϕt(x) and φt(y), respec-
10
tively, are independent of each other. Thus, the effective wave function of
subsystem A is independent of the particles in the environment, and it does
not encode the non-local influences of these particles. As noted above, since
the universal wave function factorizes in this case, the effective wave function
of subsystem A is also nomological according to the nomological view.
Next, consider the general case in which there is an extra term in the
factorization of the universal wave function:
Ψt(x, y) = ϕt(x)φt(y) + Θt(x, y), (10)
In this case, the effective wave function of subsystem A is determined by
both the universal wave function and the positions of the particles in its en-
vironment (via a measurement-like process). If Y (t) lies within the support
of φt(y), A’s effective wave function at t will be ϕt(x). If Y (t) does not lie
within the support of φt(y), A’s effective wave function at t will be not ϕt(x).
For example, suppose Θt(x, y) =
∑
n fn(x)gn(y), where gi(y) and gj(y) are
functions with macroscopically disjoint supports for any i 6= j, then if Y (t)
lies within the support of gi(y), A’s effective wave function at t will be fi(x).
It can be seen that the role played by the particles in the environment is only
selecting which function the effective wave function of subsystem A is, while
each selected function is independent of the particles in the environment and
completely determined by the universal wave function.
Therefore, the effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe does
not only encode the influences of other particles in the universe in general
cases. When the effective wave function of a subsystem has been selected,
the other particles in the universe will have no influences on the particles of
the subsystem. For example, in the double-slit experiment with one particle
at a time, the development of the position of the particle will not depend
on the positions of other particles in the universe (if only the positions of
these particles select the same effective wave function of the particle during
the experiment, e.g. Y (t) has been within the support of φt(y) during the
experiment).
To sum up, the effective wave function of a subsystem of the universe
is determined by both the universal wave function and the positions of the
particles in its environment. As a result, the effective wave function cannot
be wholly ontic, but must be partly nomological according to the nomological
view. This means that the nomological view is not consistent with the ontic
view for the quasi-isolated subsystems of the universe either.
5 Does the PBR theorem refute Bohmian mechan-
ics?
The PBR theorem says that the wave function is ontic, representing a con-
crete physical entity, while Bohmian mechanics says that the wave function is
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nomological, and the ontology of the theory consists only in particles. Since
the ontic view and the nomological view are different, Bohmian mechanics is
obviously incompatible with the result of the PBR theorem. Then an inter-
esting question arises: does the PBR theorem refute Bohmian mechanics?
To answer this question, we need a more careful analysis.
As we have seen, the PBR theorem is proved based on three precondi-
tions: (1) the quantum algorithm; (2) the ontological models framework;
and (3) the preparation independence assumption. Bohmian mechanics ad-
mits the quantum algorithm, since it keeps the core of quantum mechan-
ics. Moreover, Bohmian mechanics admits the preparation independence
assumption, since two unentangled systems (whose wave function is a prod-
uct state) have independent ontic states in the theory.4 The crux is whether
Bohmian mechanics also admits the ontological models framework.5
The ontological models framework has two fundamental assumptions.
The first assumption says that if a physical system is prepared such that
the quantum algorithm assigns a wave function to it, then after preparation
the system has a well-defined set of physical properties or an underlying
ontic state. This assumption is accepted by Bohmian mechanics, which
provides an ontology of quantum mechanics in terms of particles and their
trajectories in physical space and time. According to the theory, an isolated
system which can be assigned to a wave function is composed of particles,
and the positions of these particles are the ontic state of this system. Note
that the ontic state of the system also includes the disposition of these
particles which determines their motion via the guiding equation according
to the dispositionalist interpretation of Bohmian mechanics (Esfeld et al,
2014).
The second assumption of the ontological models framework says that
when a measurement is performed, the behaviour of the measuring device
is determined only by the ontic state of the system, along with the physical
properties of the measuring device. For a projective measurement M , this
means that the ontic state λ of a physical system determines the probability
p(k|λ,M) of different results k for the measurement M on the system. If
Bohmian mechanics also admits this assumption, then it will be refuted by
the PBR theorem. Fortunately, this is not true; Bohmian mechanics rejects
the second assumption of the ontological models framework.
4Note that the result that different orthogonal states correspond to different ontic states
can be derived in the ontological models framework without resorting to the preparation
independence assumption or other auxiliary assumptions. Thus, even if Bohmian mechan-
ics rejects the auxiliary assumptions such as the preparation independence assumption,
there is still the question of whether it is consistent with the ontological models framework,
as well as the issues that will be discussed later.
5The question of whether Bohm’s theory is consistent with the ontological models
framework has been discussed by several authors (Feintzeig, 2014; Leifer, 2014; Drezet,
2015). Here I will focus on the issue of whether Bohmian mechanics or the nomological
view of the wave function is consistent with the ontological models framework.
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In Bohmian mechanics, when a measurement is performed, the behaviour
of the measuring device is determined not only by the ontic state of the sys-
tem and the physical properties of the measuring device, but also by some-
thing else, the law of motion represented by the wave function. Concretely
speaking, for a projective measurement M , the complete ontic state λ of a
physical system and its wave function ψ both determine the probability of
different results k for the measurement M on the system, which may be de-
noted by p(k|λ, ψ,M). Note that when the wave function is not nomological
but related to the state of reality, the second assumption of the ontological
models framework should not be revised this way but keep unchanged, since
the complete ontic state λ already includes all parts of the state of reality
(see also Leifer, 2014; Drezet, 2015).
It can be seen that the PBR theorem cannot be proved based on this
revised assumption. Let us remind the basic proof strategy of the PBR
theorem. Assume there are N nonorthogonal quantum states ψi (i=1, ...
, N), which are compatible with the same ontic state λ. According to the
second assumption of the ontological models framework, the ontic state λ
determines the probability p(k|λ,M) of different results k for a measurement
M . Moreover, there is a normalization relation for any N result measure-
ment:
∑N
i=1 p(ki|λ,M) = 1. Since there is an N result measurement that
satisfies the condition that the first state gives zero Born probability to the
first result and the second state gives zero Born probability to the second
result and so on, there will be a relation p(ki|λ,M) = 0 for any i, which
contradicts the normalization relation.
Now if the second assumption of the ontological models framework is
replaced by the revised assumption, namely that the probability of different
results k for a measurement M on a physical system is determined not only
by the ontic state λ of the system, but also by its wave function ψ, i.e.
p(k|λ,M) is replaced by p(k|λ, ψ,M), then the above contradiction cannot
be derived. The reason is as follows. Under the revised assumption, the origi-
nal normalization relation for an N result measurement
∑N
i=1 p(ki|λ,M) = 1
holds true only for systems with the same wave function, and for systems
with different wave functions ψj (j = 1, ..., N), the normalization relation
should be
∑N
j=1
∑N
i=1 p(ki|λ, ψj ,M) = 1. Then, even if there is an N re-
sult measurement that satisfies the condition that the first state gives zero
Born probability to the first result and the second state gives zero Born
probability to the second result and so on, it will only lead to the relation
p(ki|λ, ψi,M) = 0 for any i. But this relation does not contradict the new
normalization relation.
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6 A deeper issue?
I have argued that the PBR theorem and Bohmian mechanics are com-
patible, and the former does not refute the latter. The reason is that the
PBR theorem and Bohmian mechanics are based on different fundamental
assumptions, and in particular, Bohmian mechanics rejects one key assump-
tion of the ontological models framework on which the PBR theorem is
based. As we will see, however, a further analysis of the rejection may bring
to our attention a potential important issue of Bohmian mechanics.
The assumption that Bohmian mechanics rejects is the second assump-
tion of the ontological models framework, which says that when a measure-
ment is performed, the behaviour of the measuring device is determined only
by the ontic state of the measured system, along with the physical properties
of the measuring device. For a projective measurement M , this assumption
means that the ontic state λ of a physical system determines the probabil-
ity p(k|λ,M) of different results k for the measurement M on the system.
Bohmian mechanics replaces this assumption with the revised assumption
that the probability of different results k for a measurement M on a physical
system is determined not only by the ontic state λ of the system, but also
by its wave function ψ, i.e. it replaces the response function p(k|λ,M) with
p(k|λ, ψ,M).
First of all, this revised assumption already admits that the wave func-
tion is real for a single system. The wave function being nomological in
Bohmian mechanics means that it is real for a single system. If the wave
function is not real for a single system, then the response function for a
single system should not explicitly depend on the wave function of the sys-
tem. However, it is arguable that the wave function being real for a single
system should not be assumed before our analysis; rather, it should be a
possible result obtained at the end of our analysis. For it directly excludes
the possibility that the wave function is not real for a single system (i.e. the
ψ-epistemic view), and also leaves the question of why the wave function is
real for a single system unanswered. This is unsatisfactory.
Next, by rejecting the second assumption of the ontological models frame-
work, Bohmian mechanics denies the existence of a universal law that applies
to different systems. This can be seen from the following simple example.
Suppose in a universe there are only two independent systems, whose wave
functions are different, being ψ1 and ψ2, respectively. In this case, the wave
function of the universe is a product state Ψ = ψ1ψ2. If there is a universal
law which applies to both systems, then the response functions for the two
systems will be the same. In other words, the existence of a universal law
supports the second assumption of the ontological models framework. Then
the proof of the PBR theorem can go through, and by the theorem we can
know that the wave function of each system represents the ontic state of the
system, namely that the wave function is ontic.
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On the other hand, in order to avoid the result of the PBR theorem,
Bohmian mechanics assumes that the response function for each system de-
pends not only on the complete ontic state of the system, but also explicitly
on the wave function of the system. Since the wave functions of the two sys-
tems are different, the response functions for them are also different. This
means that the law will be different for the two systems. Thus, Bohmian
mechanics denies the existence of a universal law which applies to both
systems.
As we know, it is a fundamental postulate of physics that the laws of
motion are universal, applying to all systems and all circumstances. The
second assumption of the ontological models framework is consistent with
this postulate, and based on this assumption we can prove the PBR theorem
and know that the wave function is ontic, representing the ontic state of a
physical system or a concrete physical entity. By comparison, it seems that
we can do little research on and know little about the physical world if
rejecting this fundamental postulate.
Consider again the above example. If there does not exist a universal
law which applies to both systems, then the response functions for the two
systems will be not the same, and there will be no connection between
these response functions either without further assumptions.6 As noted
before, we cannot directly assume that the response function is p(k|λ, ψ,M),
explicitly depending on the wave function, since it already admits that the
wave function is real for a single system, being nomological. Then, given this
little piece of information, we cannot prove the PBR theorem. Moreover, it
is arguable that we cannot know the relationship between the wave function
and the ontic state of each system, e.g. whether the wave function is ontic
or epistemic or something else, without resorting to additional assumptions.
The reason is that the consistency relation for each wave function, namely∫
dλp(k|λ,M)p(λ|ψ) = |〈k|ψ〉|2, cannot determine whether the probability
distributions of the ontic state corresponding to two different wave functions
such as p(λ|ψ1) and p(λ|ψ2) overlap when there is no connection between
the response functions for different wave functions in the relation, such as
p1(k|λ,M) for ψ1 and p2(k|λ,M) for ψ2. Since we cannot know whether
the wave function is real for a single system, we cannot be sure whether the
wave function is nomological and Bohmian mechanics is true either.
To sum up, Bohmian mechanics denies the existence of a universal law
in order to avoid the result of the PBR theorem. But this will arguably
prevent us from knowing the nature of the wave function in the theory.
6Note that if only the response functions are the same for the two systems with any
different wave functions, then by the PBR theorem we can prove that the ontic states of
the two systems are different in Bohm’s theory. But this will reject Bohmian mechanics,
according to which two systems with different wave functions may have the same ontic
state (e.g. two particles have the same position).
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7 Conclusions
The PBR theorem proves that the wave function is ontic, representing the
ontic state of a physical system or a concrete physical entity. On the other
hand, Bohmian mechanics regards the wave function as not ontic but nomo-
logical, like a law of nature. This raises interesting questions: are the ontic
view and the nomological view of wave function compatible? If the answer is
negative, then does the PBR theorem refute Bohmian mechanics? It seems
widely thought that the ontic view and the nomological view are compatible,
and the PBR theorem has no implications for Bohmian mechanics.
In this paper, I argue that this is not the case. First, I point out that
the nomological view and the ontic view are two different views of the wave
function. This means that the result of the PBR theorem and Bohmian me-
chanics are incompatible. Next, I argue that the PBR theorem and Bohmian
mechanics are nevertheless compatible, and the former does not refute the
latter. The reason is that the PBR theorem and Bohmian mechanics are
based on different fundamental assumptions, and in particular, Bohmian
mechanics rejects one key assumption of the ontological models framework
on which the PBR theorem is based. Finally, I argue that by rejecting this
assumption to avoid the result of the PBR theorem, Bohmian mechanics
denies the existence of a universal law, while this will arguably prevent us
from knowing the nature of the wave function in the theory.
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